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Abstract 
Although the later Wittgenstein appears as one of the most influential figures in Davidson’s 
later works on meaning, it is not, for the most part, clear how Davidson interprets and employs 
Wittgenstein’s ideas. In this paper, I will argue that Davidson’s later works on meaning can be 
seen as mainly a manifestation of his attempt to accommodate the later Wittgenstein’s basic 
ideas about meaning and understanding, especially the requirement of drawing the seems 
right/is right distinction and the way this requirement must be met. These ideas, however, are 
interpreted by Davidson in his own way. I will then argue that Davidson even attempts to 
respect Wittgenstein’s quietism, provided that we understand this view in the way Davidson 
does. Having argued for that, I will finally investigate whether, for Davidson at least, his more 
theoretical and supposedly explanatory projects, such as that of constructing a formal theory of 
meaning and his use of the notion of triangulation, are in conflict with this Wittgensteinian 
quietist view.  
Keywords: Interpretation, Prior and Passing Theories, Triangulation, Quietism, Wittgenstein, 
Davidson. 
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1. Davidson on Wittgenstein 
It is hard to deny that Davidson’s later works on meaning have been in some fashion inspired 
by Wittgenstein’s Investigations.1 The difficult task, however, is to clearly identify such 
influences since he seems to have his own unique reading of the main doctrines of the 
Investigations, a sort of reading that has not yet been properly investigated. What is clear is 
that Wittgenstein’s remarks on private language, rule-following and ostensive learning are 
taken seriously by Davidson. To see how these ideas manifest themselves in Davidson’s works, 
we should first briefly look at his later view of meaning, in which such Wittgensteinian ideas 
are the main concern of Davidson.  
 
1.1. Davidson’s Later View of Meaning 
Let me briefly explain what I mean by Davidson’s “later works”. By Davidson’s “earlier 
works” I mean his famous papers on how to construct a formal theory of meaning on the basis 
of a Tarski-style theory of truth and the discussion of radical interpretation.2 In this period, 
Davidson focuses on the features of a theory of truth which can systematically specify, in its 
theorems, the truth-condition of any sentence of the language for which the theory is 
constructed, via specifying, in the theory’s axioms, the semantic properties of different parts of 
the sentences, such as the reference of names and the satisfaction conditions for predicates. In 
order to be assured that the theory is producing the right sort of truth-conditions, it should be 
constructed by an interpreter (a radical interpreter) who supposedly possesses no information 
of the language under consideration and the mental states of the speaker. 
    Davidson’s “later works”, though still take such Tarski-style theories to be what can best 
describe the linguistic skills of the speaker to speak and the interpreter to understand, shift the 
focus to the conditions on success in communication, as well as the conditions on how language 
and thought may generally emerge. His discussion of the role of rules and conventions in 
explaining such success and his remarks on the notion of triangulation appear in this part of his 
philosophical writings. Such a shift, however, is not a shift from one project to an entirely 
different one; rather a shift in focus. Davidson does not abandon the important results of his 
                                                            
1 See, e.g., Davidson (1991a), (1992), (1994a), (1995), (1999a) and (2001d). 
2 See, e.g., Davidson (1966), (1967), (1968), (1973a), (1973b), and (1974a). 
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earlier project; rather he applies them to a different sort of situation. He is still concerned with 
how a theory can systematically specify the meaning of the speakers’ utterances, whether they 
speak in the standard way or deviate from it. Nonetheless, it is clear that the sort of problems 
he faces in this case – i.e., the case of “non-radical interpretation”3 – is in some respects 
different from those he had to deal with in his discussion of radical interpretation, though 
insofar as “understanding” the speech of others is concerned, the problems do not differ 
dramatically.4 
   The way I want to construe Davidson’s later view of meaning is to treat it as a view which 
emerges as an alternative to what Davidson takes to be an inadequate, but widely accepted, 
explanation of the practice of meaning something by an utterance. Davidson’s attack on this 
view starts especially by his paper “Communication and Convention” (1984b).5 In this paper, 
Davidson argues that the practice of speaking a language is not at all comparable to the 
practices in which following rules or conforming to conventions is essential, such as that of 
playing and winning a game or doing mathematics. The latter practices have a combination of 
features that speaking a language lacks.6 Here, we are most concerned with the alternative view 
which Davidson arrives at after rejecting the above view. According to this alternative 
Davidsonian view, “linguistic communication does not require … rule-governed repetition” at 
all (1984b, 279-280).7 
   For Davidson, “convention does not help explain what is basic to linguistic communication” 
(1984b, 280) and this is the idea that is repeated, and more broadly argued for, in his more 
recent papers on the topic, at least in “A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs” (1986), “The Second 
                                                            
3 See, e.g., Heal (1997, 300). 
4 For more on this issue, see Glüer (2011, 110-111, 121-124), Heal (1997) and Ludwig and Lepore (2005, 22-23, 
74-77). 
5 It is not a mere coincidence, I believe, that such an attack on conventionalism and communitarianism starts less 
than two years after the publication of Kripke’s (1982) book on Wittgenstein, in which Kripke takes Wittgenstein 
to be offering a sort of communitarianist view of meaning. Although, in “Communication and Convention”, 
Davidson does not mention Wittgenstein or Kripke’s Wittgenstein, in the later relevant papers – which basically 
develop similar criticisms to those put forward in “Communications and Convention” – Wittgenstein and then 
Kripke’s Wittgenstein gradually show up. See, e.g., Davidson (1992), (1994a), and (2001d). 
6 The features are put by Davidson as follows: (1) Those who play a game usually want, or at least, “represent 
themselves as wanting to win”; (2) “one can win only by making moves defined by the rules of the game, and 
winning is wholly defined by the rules”; and (3) “winning can be, and often is, an end in itself” (1984b, 267). 
According to Davidson, “no linguistic behaviour has this combination of features” (1984b, 267). 
7 For more on Davidson’s criticisms of conventionalism, see, e.g., Glüer (2001) and (2013), Fennell (2015) and 
Wheeler (2013). 
4 
 
Person” (1992) and “The Social Aspect of Language” (1994a). Davidson now believes that 
following rules or conforming to certain conventions is neither necessary nor sufficient for 
successful communication between two people to be achieved.8 Davidson’s reason for such a 
claim goes as follows. Knowledge of the conventional meaning of words is not necessary 
because the speaker may use her words differently from the way her speech-community uses 
them and, according to Davidson, we usually have no trouble understanding such utterances.9 
The reason is that if the available evidence and clues are enough for the interpreter to 
understand the speaker’s utterance in the way the speaker intended it to be understood, 
communication has been successful and the interpreter’s or the speaker’s knowledge of what 
the words conventionally or otherwise mean would thereby play no essential role in explaining 
such success. Nor is knowledge of the conventional meaning of words sufficient for their 
communication to be successful because in order to understand what the speaker intends to 
mean by her words, even if she means what the words conventionally mean, the interpreter 
needs knowledge and information over and above mere knowledge of the conventional 
meaning of the words. The interpreter at least needs to know that the speaker intended her 
words to mean what they conventionally mean: “even when a speaker is speaking in accord 
with a socially acceptable theory he speaks with the intention of being understood in a certain 
way, and this intention depends on … how he believes or assumes they will understand him” 
(Davidson 1994a, 122). Much different information is involved in reaching such an 
understanding including, for instance, knowledge of the fact that the speaker, if happy, changes 
her use of such and such words in such and such a way and if sad, would conform to the 
standard way of using them, etc. 
   The next problem which Davidson’s alternative view faces is to answer the question how we 
can decide whether the speaker has gone wrong, whether she succeeds (or fails) to speak in an 
understandable way. Davidson’s solution is to take “the intention to be taken to mean what one 
wants to be taken to mean” to constitute a norm against which the verbal behaviour of the 
speaker can be measured. As he puts it, such an intention “is common to all verbal behaviour” 
and “provides a purpose which any speaker must have in speaking, and thus constitutes a norm 
against which speakers and others can measure the success of verbal behavior” (Davidson 
                                                            
8 Davidson does not draw a clear distinction between the notion of a rule and that of a convention. As we will see, 
he later uses these notions, together with those of institutions, customs, norms, and standard, interchangeably. 
9 See Davidson (1986, 90), especially for his famous example of Mrs. Malaprop. 
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1994a, 120). Such a norm is what Davidson is left with after arguing that conforming to the 
social way of using words is neither necessary nor sufficient for success in communication. 
Davidson takes the idiolect – the particular way a speaker intends to speak on particular 
occasions – rather than the language – as a previously fixed set of (syntactical and semantical) 
rules – to be primary. The problem is “if the former [is conceptually primary], the apparent 
absence of a social norm makes it hard to account for success in communication; if the latter, 
the danger is that the norm has no clear relation to practice” (Davidson 1994a, 109). Davidson 
rejected the philosophical importance of the latter norm, that is, the requirement of speaking as 
others do. Davidson’s alternative norm is linked with the purpose Davidson thinks every 
speaker has, and must have, when she starts a conversation with another: she intends her 
utterance to be understood in a particular way, whether or not such a way of speaking accords 
with the conventional way. This is, one may prefer to add, an action-guiding norm governing 
the speaker’s way of using words and providing Davidson with a different notion of 
correctness. If the speaker deviates from the conventional way of speaking, it does not follow 
that she has gone wrong if her utterance is understood in the way she intended. She has gone 
wrong if she fails to make her utterance understood by her hearer. Thus Davidson concludes, 
“meaning … gets its life from those situations in which someone intends … that his words will 
be understood in a certain way, and they are” (1994a, 120).10 The speaker is not even required 
to continue speaking as she did in the past since, again, success in this practice depends on the 
speaker’s intentionally or otherwise providing enough evidence and clues for her interpreter to 
reach the intended interpretation of the speaker’s utterance.11 Therefore, if there is anything to 
be “shared” by the speaker and the interpreter, it is what the speaker means by her utterance, 
that is, their “understanding of the speaker’s words” (Davidson 1986, 96). They are not required 
to mean the same thing by the same word or speak as any others do. Rather “meaning something 
requires that by and large one follows a practice of one’s own, a practice that can be understood 
by others” (Davidson 1994a, 125). 
 
 
 
                                                            
10 See also Davidson (1986, 97, 99, 101), (1991b, 1-2), (1993a, 171-174), (1987a, 457) and (1992, 111-112, 116). 
11 See, e.g., Davidson (1984b, 277-278) and (1992, 114).  
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2. Davidson on the Wittgensteinian Seems Right/Is Right Distinction 
Davidson’s concern was to accommodate “the distinction Wittgenstein has made central to the 
study of meaning, the distinction between using words correctly and merely thinking one is 
using them correctly, without appeal to the test of common usage” (Davidson 1994a, 119). 
Recall that Davidson has already rejected the sort of straightforward criterion which took 
conforming to, or failing to conform to, some previously fixed conventions to be what 
determines the speaker’s success, or failure, in her practice of meaning something by an 
utterance. But, as Davidson asks, “if there is no social practice with which to compare the 
speaker’s performance, won’t whatever the speaker says be, as Wittgenstein remarks, in accord 
with some rule (i.e. in accord with some language)?” (1992, 116). What worried Davidson was 
indeed to find a way to avoid the paradox which Wittgenstein has famously introduced in the 
Investigations: “This was our paradox: no course of action could be determined by a rule, 
because every course of action can be made out to accord with the rule. The answer was: if 
everything can be made out to accord with the rule, then it can also be made out to conflict 
with it. And so there would be neither accord nor conflict here” (1953, §201). Having rejected 
the conventionalist and similar socially-based norms, Davidson now sees his account 
vulnerable to this paradox: given that he has granted the speaker with freedom of using words 
in whatever way she may intend, if there is no public criterion for assessing the speaker’s 
responses, we must take whatever seems right to her to be right, no matter how she responds. 
Davidson’s concern was to rescue his account from such a threat.   
   He proposed “being interpreted as intended” as his new norm for evaluating the behaviour of 
the speaker. Although the speaker follows a practice of her own, she may still fail to speak in 
an interpretable way because, for instance, she may fail to provide enough evidence for her 
interpreter to successfully interpret her utterance. In such cases, although it may seem to the 
speaker that she means something by her utterance, she actually fails to do so.12 This criterion 
helps Davidson to distinguish between the situations in which the speaker merely intends her 
utterance to be interpreted in a particular way and the situations in which her utterance is 
interpreted in that way. On this view, however, there has to be a second person interpreting the 
speaker’s utterances if there is to be any account of error available at all, i.e., any chance to 
draw the seems right/is right distinction. For Davidson, such a distinction and the way to draw 
it are all fundamentally Wittgensteinian. As he says, the solution “Wittgenstein seems to offer 
                                                            
12 For Davidson, this also explains the fallibility of self-knowledge. See, e.g., Davidson (1984a, 111). 
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… is: without an interpreter no substance can be given to the claim that the speaker has gone 
wrong” (1992, 116). These remarks more clearly appear in Davidson’s discussion of the notion 
of triangulation. 
 
2.1. Triangulation and Ostensive Learning 
We can see how fundamental the Wittgensteinian aforementioned distinction becomes for 
Davidson by looking at his discussion of the notion of triangulation.13 Davidson is an 
externalist about meaning, according to which “what a person’s words mean depends in the 
most basic cases on the kinds of objects and events that have caused the person to hold the 
words to be applicable” (1987a, 456).14 This means that in order to understand what the speaker 
means by her words, the interpreter must at least successfully determine to what objects or 
events in the world the speaker intends to apply her words. He must find out what (typically) 
causes the speaker to utter the words she does. In this sense, the “actual external cause” of the 
speaker’s utterance must be determined first if the utterance is to have any meaning at all. 
Davidson’s claim is that without the presence of a second person linguistically interacting with 
the speaker, there would be no determinate cause for the speaker’s responses and thoughts at 
all and thereby no meaning and mental content. This claim and the problems which Davidson’s 
discussion of triangulation detects, on my reading of Davidson’s remarks on these issues, are 
all deeply inspired by Wittgenstein’s remarks on private language and ostensive learning. Let 
me briefly introduce their views of ostensive learning. In order to do so, I will first focus on 
the way Wittgenstein introduces what he calls “ostensive teaching of words”. It is important 
for our discussion because, for Davidson, “ostensive learning … is an example of triangulation” 
(2001d, 114). 
   Wittgenstein introduces the notion of ostensive learning in this famous passage: “An 
important part of the training will consist in the teacher’s pointing to the objects, directing the 
child’s attention to them, and at the same time uttering a word ... (I do not want to call this 
‘ostensive definition’, because the child cannot as yet ask what the name is. I will call it 
‘ostensive teaching of words’ …)” (1953, §6). Would engaging in this process be enough to 
                                                            
13 This notion appears in Davidson’s different papers, see, e.g., Davidson (1992, 117-119), (2001d, 143), (1994a, 
124), (1982, 105), (1991a, 213-213), (2001e) and (1999a, 128-130). 
14 See also Davidson (1991a, 213), (2001d, 138) and (1988a, 44-45). 
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say that the learner has learnt the meaning of the words she utters or their correct use? 
Wittgenstein and Davidson both reply negatively. I believe their reasons are similar, though 
their focus is different: Davidson thinks that “Wittgenstein … thought this point applies only 
when the stimulus is private; I think it holds for all cases” (1994a, 124). Wittgenstein focuses 
on “private ostension definitions”, while Davidson’s concern includes all sorts of stimuli, 
especially the external ones (though as Wittgenstein’s examples in the above passage show, 
Wittgenstein too begins by the process of learning how to apply certain words to external 
objects). Davidson even extends his point to the case of learning the conventional meanings of 
words: “If we think of ostension only as the teaching of a socially viable meaning we miss the 
essential [Wittgensteinian] lesson, which is that for the learner ostension is not learning 
something already there. The learner is in a meaning baptism” (1997c, 140). Wittgenstein made 
a similar point when he said “the child cannot as yet ask what the name is” (1953, §6). What 
does Wittgenstein think of this process? 
   The way our words get connected with certain items in the world is the concern of 
Wittgenstein in the beginning of his Investigations when he talks about Augustine’s picture of 
human language: “the individual words in language name objects … Every word has a 
meaning. This meaning is correlated with the word. It is the object for which the word stands” 
(§1). Our first impression is that the link between language and the world is secured through 
engaging in the process of ostensive learning. As Wittgenstein says, “when they (my elders) 
named some object, and accordingly moved toward something, I saw this and I grasped that 
the thing was called by the sound they uttered when they meant to point it out” (§1). In this 
process of, say, conditioning and generalizing, “I gradually learnt to understand what objects 
they signified; and after I had trained my mouth to form these signs, I used them to express my 
own desires” (§1). Wittgenstein’s concern here is as general as Davidson’s: he talks about 
learning words by ostension when the stimuli are external (observable objects and events) and 
then using them in the case of private stimuli. But Wittgenstein’s reasons for why this process 
alone fails to bestow meaning to our words are offered in his discussion of private ostension 
definitions:  
‘What would it be like if human beings shewed no outward signs of pain …? Then it would be 
impossible to teach a child the use of the word ‘tooth-ache’. Well, let’s assume the child … 
invents a name for the sensation! … When one says ‘He gave a name to his sensation’ one 
forgets that a great deal of stage-setting in the language is presupposed if the mere act of naming 
is to make sense. (§257) 
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What is the real problem here? To name something and to understand what that word names 
requires understanding what it is to go wrong, that is, to make a mistake, and this cannot be 
achieved in isolation, without having some public criterion for evaluating the learner’s 
responses. This problem is the main, or perhaps the only, concern of Davidson’s discussion of 
the notion of triangulation: What does it take for a creature to acquire the concept of error, to 
command the distinction between what seems right to it and what is actually right? The paradox 
Wittgenstein earlier introduced is the result of failing to provide such a norm against which the 
speaker’s responses can be assessed.  
   Wittgenstein believes that if there is no manifestation of these inner states or processes and 
no public criterion for evaluating the learner’s relevant responses, we have no other way than 
to embrace the unwelcome conclusion that whatever seems right to her is right. When there are 
others observing and responding to the speaker’s responses, there appears an opportunity to 
tell whether the speaker has responded correctly to such and such stimuli. Otherwise, the 
paradox of everything’s being right and wrong at the same time would be waiting for us. 
Davidson nicely puts his reading of Wittgenstein’s remarks on this matter as follows: 
“Wittgenstein has suggested, or at least I take him to have suggested, that we would not have 
the concept of getting things wrong or right if it were not for our interactions with other people” 
(1999a, 129). As Wittgenstein says in his discussion of rule-following: “to think one is obeying 
a rule is not to obey a rule. Hence it is not possible to obey a rule ‘privately’: otherwise thinking 
one was obeying a rule would be the same thing as obeying it” (1953, §202). Davidson points 
to a similar problem: “in the early stage of ostensive learning, error has no point for the learner 
… and where error has no point, there is not a concept or thought” (2000, 14). As we will see 
in the next section, especially in Davidson’s discussion of triangulation, this Wittgensteinian 
problem does not disappear simply if we shift from internal stimuli to external ones, such as 
tables and trees.  
   Davidson also argues against the claim that correction alone may enable the learner to acquire 
the concept of error. When the learner goes wrong, for instance, by applying “table” to a chair, 
the teacher can correct her responses and it then seems as if she is going right by now applying 
“table” in the way her teacher does. Davidson, however, believes that “corrections … can in 
themselves do no more than improve the dispositions we were born with, and dispositions, as 
Wittgenstein emphasized, have no normative force” (1997c, 138). Dispositions do not tell how 
the learner ought to use the word in future cases; they rather tell how she is using the word. For 
Davidson, the learner herself should acquire and apply the concept of truth: she should master 
10 
 
the seems right/is right distinction. This is the difference between mere disposition to respond 
in a certain way and judging that a way of responding is correct (correct, of course, in the way 
Davidson introduced the notion, that is, speaking in an understandable way). Animals’ 
responses can be corrected: we can train a parrot to respond by “table” to certain things and if 
it goes wrong, we can correct it. But the stimuli and the responses are viewed as “correct” only 
from our point of view, from the point of view of those who already possess the concept of 
truth. Thus, “you can deceive yourself into thinking that the child is talking if it makes sounds 
which, if made by a genuine language user, would have a definite meaning. (It is even possible 
to do this with chimpanzees)” (Davidson 1999a, 127). Engaging in the process of ostensive 
learning is not by itself enough to say of the creature that it possesses meaningful responses:  
The interaction between adult and child in the ostensive learning situation … provides the 
necessary conditions for the emergence of language and propositional thought, by creating a 
space in which there can be success and failure. What is clear is that we can say the child thinks 
something is red … only if it appreciates the distinction between the judgment and the truth for 
itself … It is the step from … mere conditioned response to what Wittgenstein called ‘following 
a rule’. This is where the concept of truth enters. (Davidson 2000, 13-14) 
Judgements involve the possession of a rich set of concepts and propositional attitudes: “being 
able to discriminate cats is not the same thing as having the concept of a cat. You have the 
concept of a cat only if you can make sense of the idea of misapplying the concept, of believing 
or judging that something is a cat which is not a cat” (Davidson 1999a, 124).15 Crediting the 
speaker with the concept of truth, which enables her to name things, really presupposes “a great 
deal of stage-setting in the language”, as Wittgenstein said. Thus, for both Davidson and 
Wittgenstein, ostensive learning, corrections and mere correlation between the creatures’ 
responses (between, for instance, the parrot’s and mine) would not be sufficient to say that the 
learner has mastered the seems right/is right distinction, though it seems to be a necessary 
condition.16  
   This, however, does not mean that there is no difference between Wittgenstein and Davidson 
on this matter. Both agreed that lacking a public criterion for assessing the speaker’s responses 
leads to the conclusion that “whatever is going to seem right to me is right. And that only means 
                                                            
15 And the holism of the mental would imply that “unless you have a lot of beliefs about what a cat is, you don’t 
have the concept of a cat” (Davidson 1999a, 124). See also Davidson (1982, 98-99). 
16 As Wittgenstein says, ostensive learning “will form an important part of the training” (1953, §2). 
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that here we can’t talk about right” (1953, §258). Davidson, however, believes that it does not 
matter whether the teacher teaches the learner to respond in the same way in which her speech 
community does. For Davidson, such a particular (Dummettian) notion of “agreement in use” 
is not basic; it is rather a “shallow notion of correct usage” (Davidson 1986, 91) which should 
be thrown away. It is true that Davidson seems to depart from Wittgenstein here, but what he 
adds later makes his view again very similar to Wittgenstein’s. Davidson believes that essential 
to the development of thought and language is “the fact that all people generalize naturally in 
much the same ways. ... The sharing of responses to stimuli found similar allows an 
interpersonal element to emerge” (1997c, 140). This is not a radically different claim from 
Wittgenstein’s. For Davidson, in order for the speaker’s responses to be counted as correct she 
does not have to go on in the same way as others do. But, at least at the earlier stages of language 
learning, sharing similar responses to similar things in the world is taken by Davidson to be an 
essential element in the emergence of language and thought.17 In the end, they both take the 
existence of a certain sort of shared responses to be fundamental for the creatures to be said to 
command the seems right/is right distinction.18 
    
2.2. Triangulation, Private Language and Externalism 
As previously indicated, Davidson is an externalist about meaning, but whether the later 
Wittgenstein approves this view is a matter of controversy. In order to investigate whether 
Davidson is following Wittgenstein with regard to the problems with meaning-determination 
and other relevant issues, we do not need to show that Wittgenstein too is an externalist or if 
he is, his version of externalism is compatible with Davidson’s. It would rather be enough to 
show that Davidson’s concerns here are largely Wittgensteinian. However, with regard to the 
matter of externalism, both can be said to take the context of use very seriously, together with 
the necessity of the existence of a public criterion for assessing the speaker’s responses and the 
dependence of such a criterion on the presence of a community of speakers, or at least another 
speaker, interacting with the subject. Child (2010), for instance, believes that, for Wittgenstein 
                                                            
17 For a similar point, see Miller (2017, 320-323).    
18 Another difference between the two, which I will have no space to discuss here, is the matter of relativism. 
Davidson rejects conceptual relativism and claims that if something can be said to be a language, it is translatable 
into our own language. See, e.g., Davidson (1974b) and (1988a). But, on the contrary, Wittgenstein seems to 
believe that “If a lion could talk, we could not understand him” (1953, 225). 
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too, “the content of a subject’s thoughts and words … depends not just on … the words she is 
disposed to utter, but also on the context in which these things occur. And, like modern 
externalists, Wittgenstein sometimes supports his externalist claims by Twin-Earth-style 
thought experiments” (Child 2010, 63). Proudfoot (2004) also believes that “Wittgenstein was 
an externalist”, according to which “A’s psychological states and their representational 
contents are individuated in terms of A’s behaviour, history, and social environment, 
irrespective of A’s internal states” (2004, 289). Davidson’s externalism would be compatible 
with these claims, especially with the view that the history of the speaker’s interactions with 
others and the environment, as well as the context of using words, plays a vital role in 
determining the meaning of the speaker’s utterances.19 These externalist readings of 
Wittgenstein’s Investigations would help to see why Davidson’s discussion of the notion of 
triangulation can be taken to be a more general treatment of the problems Wittgenstein already 
uncovers in his discussion of rule-following and private language. According to Proudfoot, 
Wittgenstein believed that “an entity A that behaves in accordance with a rule is a rule-follower 
only if A has a certain history and environment” (2004, 289). As indicated in the previous 
section, Davidson thought of this Wittgensteinian remark on rule-following as pointing to the 
distinction between mere dispositions to respond in certain ways and judging that one way of 
responding is correct. His discussion of triangulation, I believe, is an attempt to show that, for 
Wittgensteinian reasons, it cannot be enough that two people merely correlate their similar 
responses to some stimuli, whether the stimuli are external or internal. 
   Davidson believes that, for a solitary speaker considered in isolation, it is doubly ambiguous 
to what objects she is responding: “Cause is doubly indeterminate: with respect to width, and 
with respect to distance” (Davidson 1999a, 129).20 For a solitary speaker, it is not determinate 
(I) whether it is a proximal cause, e.g., some stimulation on the speaker’s skin, or a distal cause, 
e.g., an object a certain distance from her in the world, that actually causes the speaker’s 
responses (“the distance or the depth problem”) and (II) whether it is one aspect of the cause 
                                                            
19 Cf. Davidson’s important context-sensitive notion of “first meaning” (Davidson 1986, 91). See also 
Davidson’s famous Swampman example in his (1987a, 19). 
20 Of course, Wittgenstein is not a causal-theorist and this is another difference between the two. As Proudfoot 
puts it, for Wittgenstein, “ordinary (belief-desire) psychological explanation is not causal; we can give different 
such explanations of the behaviour of individuals who are physical duplicates but have different histories or 
environments” (2004, 289). Although Davidson takes causal relations between the speaker and the world to be 
essential, he does not deny that two people alike in all physical states may differ in what they mean by their words 
because of the differences in the history of their interactions with the world (see, again, his Swampman argument 
(1987a, 19)). I will say more about Davidson’s especial use of the notion of causality in due course.  
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rather than another that indeed causes the speaker’s thoughts and utterances (“the width or 
aspect problem”). Not only does any such cause-determination require the speaker to possess 
the concept of truth, or command the Wittgensteinian seems right/is right distinction, but 
without having such a concept the objectivity of thought would also be lost since in order for 
a creature to have objective thoughts, it must be aware of the distinction between believing that 
something is the case and that thing’s being the case independently of what the creature 
believes.21 Davidson’s Wittgensteinian reason is that in the case of a solitaire, whatever she 
takes to be the actual cause of her responses will be the actual cause of her responses, no matter 
what it is. This means that whatever she takes to be a correct response would be correct and 
hence, as Wittgenstein puts it, we cannot talk about correctness anymore: “As Wittgenstein 
says, by yourself you can’t tell the difference between the situations seeming the same and 
being the same” (Davidson 1994a, 124). Nothing essentially new has been offered by Davidson 
here but to cite Wittgenstein’s remarks on private language and rule-following. 
   However, if for having meaningful responses the causes of the responses should get 
determined, then both the distance and the width problems should be solved. Davidson’s idea 
is that employing the notion of triangulation would help to deal with the problems. He first 
distinguishes between “primitive” and “linguistic” triangulation.22 Primitive triangulation 
involves the responses of two creatures, each of them similarly responds to a certain stimulus 
in the world and to the other creature’s responses to that stimulus. This, according to Davidson, 
helps to locate the actual cause of the creatures’ responses. As indicated before, Davidson 
appeals to the Wittgensteinian remarks on ostensive learning and takes such a basic situation 
as an instance of triangulation.23 Suppose that a child, in whatever way, is taught to respond by 
“table” to what we are responding to by “table”. In this situation, “where the lines from child 
to table and us to table converge, ‘the’ stimulus is located” (Davidson 1992, 119). The “actual 
cause” of the child’s response is the stimulus in the world to which we and the child similarly 
respond by “table”. Moreover, as each of us is observing the other’s responses, our similar 
responses are thereby correlated so that if such a correlation breaks it creates the space for the 
child to make sense of the concept of truth: if the child responds by “chair” to the same stimulus 
                                                            
21 See, e.g., Davidson (1991a, 217). 
22 See, e.g., Davidson (1997c, 140-141), (1993a, 176-177), (1998a, 86),  (1992, 117), (1999a, 130), (1994a, 124), 
and (1993b, 609-610). 
23 See Davidson (2000, 71-72), (2001d, 114), (1997c, 138-140), (1994b, 435-436), (2001b, xv), and (1998a, 86-
90). For a discussion of this issue, see Stroud (2017, 125-127). 
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to which we all were responding by “table”, the child finds out that there is a difference between 
what she took to be the right response and what is the right one independently of what seemed 
to her.  
   Davidson thinks that being engaged in primitive triangulation would not be enough to claim 
that the creatures now possess a language and thoughts since such a form of triangulation 
emerges between animals with no language too.24 Primitive triangulation is not sufficient, 
though necessary, for the creatures’ responses to become meaningful. Davidson then claims 
that what needs to be added is linguistic interactions: “Language fills in and enriches the base 
of the triangle” (1993b, 610). What Davidson means by linguistic triangulation is indeed 
nothing but engaging in the procedure of mutual interpretation or “linguistic communication” 
(Davidson 1982, 105): 
the only way of knowing that … the second creature or person … is reacting to the same object 
as oneself is to know that the other person has the same object in mind. … For two people to 
know of each other that they are so related, that their thoughts are so related, requires that they 
be in communication. … they must each be an interpreter of the other. (1992, 120-121)25 
There was a deep problem in the primitive triangulation that mutual interpretation is now 
supposed to solve, that is, that no matter how similar the responses of the two creatures to an 
object are and how many times such similar responses are repeated, there are always different 
aspects of the object that can be taken to be prompting those similar responses in the creatures, 
and there was nothing, in primitive triangulation, by appealing to which we could show that 
the creatures respond to the same aspect of the object.  
   This may look like the Quinean indeterminacy problem. But the fact that, for Davidson, the 
aspect problem is solved via engaging in mutual interpretation – as Davidson said above, 
interpretation enables the one “to know that the other person has the same object in mind” – 
shows that it differs from the indeterminacy problem. There are controversies about Davidson’s 
treatment of Quine’s indeterminacy of translation arguments as well as his reading of Kripke’s 
Wittgenstein’s sceptical problem. The limitations of space do not allow me to engage in this 
                                                            
24 See Davidson (1999a, 130) and (1997c, 140). 
25 For discussions of this issue and of Davidson’s “argument from triangulation”, see Verheggen (1997), (2006) 
and (2007), Verheggen and Myers (2016), Glüer (2011, 232-241) and (2006), Talmage (1997), Lasonen and 
Marvan (2004) and Ludwig and Lepore (2005, Section 22). 
15 
 
discussion here.26 But a point is worth noting with regard to the Quinean indeterminacy 
problem and the Davidsonian aspect problem. According to Quine, the indeterminacy of 
translation implies that “two conflicting manuals of translation can both do justice to all 
dispositions to behavior, and that, in such a case, there is no fact of the matter of which manual 
is right” (1981, 23). And he concludes that “where indeterminacy of translation applies, there 
is no real question of right choice; there is no fact of the matter” (Quine 1968, 275). Although 
Davidson, controversially I believe,27 treats this problem as if it is an epistemological problem 
and claims that it “does not entail that there are no facts of the matter” (1999b, 596), he does 
not think that the indeterminacy problem would be solved by engaging in the procedure of 
interpretation and thereby in the linguistic triangulation. The aspect problem, as Davidson puts 
it, implies that even if we can determine that the stimulus is distal (rather than proximal), the 
primitive triangulation – i.e. mere correlations between our similar responses to that object 
(such as the process of ostensive learning) – would not be enough to determine whether we are 
both responding to the same aspect of that stimulus. He thinks that this is the Wittgensteinian 
problem which has to be solved because, for Wittgenstein too, ostensive learning was not 
enough to claim that one is responding to the same aspect of the object as I do. We need 
something more than mere dispositions to respond, even similarly, to certain stimuli in the 
world. We need, as Davidson’s Wittgenstein suggested, to be assured of the fact that the learner 
herself has mastered the seems right/is right distinction and that she and her teacher interpret 
each other and are interpreted by each other. In this case, Davidson thinks that the problem is 
solved: both the triangulators, through interpreting each other, would get access to the mind of 
the other; they would know that they are responding to the same object. The Quinean 
indeterminacy problem, even on Davidson’s reading of it, would not be solved in this way 
because Quine and Davidson have already taken both the speaker and the translator to possess 
rich enough languages and to be equipped with the concepts required to make the relevant 
judgements about the translations of the speaker’s utterances. While Davidson thinks that the 
aspect problem is solved once the triangulators engage in mutual interpretation, he thinks that 
the indeterminacy problem remains because in interpreting a speaker we may always face the 
situations in which two options are available: either to interpret the speaker’s utterance as 
meaning something different (but to attribute to her the same belief as we did in the past) or to 
                                                            
26 For discussions of this issue, see Verheggen and Sultanescu (2019), Hossein Khani (2019), (2018a) and (2018b), 
and Kemp (2012, 127). 
27 See Hossein Khani (2018a). 
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attribute a different belief to her (but to take the speaker to mean the same thing as she did in 
the past).28 
   What we have so far considered can show how Davidson’s later works on meaning have been 
vastly and mainly dedicated to the project of finding an alternative way – different, for instance, 
from that of Kripke’s and Dummett’s – to accommodate Wittgenstein’s fundamental remarks 
on meaning, especially the requirement of drawing the seems right/is right distinction.29 
Without commanding such a distinction, which itself requires communication with others, 
there would be no practice of meaning something by an utterance. As Davidson puts it, “the 
central argument against private languages is that, unless a language is shared, there is no way 
to distinguish between using the language correctly and using it incorrectly; only 
communication with another can supply an objective check” (1991a, 209-210). And what he 
means by such “an objective check” is very similar to Wittgenstein’s search for a public 
criterion to assess the speaker’s responses to the world and to her own internal states.30 The 
problem Davidson proposes and the solution he offers are both extracted from Wittgenstein’s 
Investigations, as he himself says, “it [triangulation] does end with what may be Wittgenstein’s 
conclusion: language is necessarily a social affair” (1992, 117). Again, “without a second 
person there is, as Wittgenstein powerfully suggests, no basis for a judgement that a reaction 
is wrong or, therefore, right” (1997a, 83).31 As discussed in Section 2.1, what Davidson learns 
from Wittgenstein is that “to have a belief it is not enough to discriminate among aspects of 
the world, to behave in different ways in different circumstances; a snail or a periwinkle does 
this. Having a belief demands in addition appreciating the contrast between true belief and 
false, between appearance and reality, mere seeming and being” (Davidson 1991a, 209).  
   I believe, however, that Davidson also respects Wittgenstein’s quietist approach to 
philosophical perplexities. In order to show this, let me begin by Davidson’s remarks on how 
two people may reach an understanding of each other. 
                                                            
28 See, e.g., Davidson (1998b, 317) and (1973a, 139). 
29 My aim in this paper has been to remain faithful to what Davidson says of Wittgenstein’s remarks in the 
Investigations, rather than Kripke’s reading of it. Davidson’s interpretation of Wittgenstein is different from 
Kripke’s and Dummett’s. I believe Davidson attempts to offer an alternative reading of what he thinks 
Wittgenstein has made central to the study of meaning. 
30 Davidson famously argues that knowledge of the external world, knowledge of other minds and knowledge of 
one’s own mind are all interconnected and none has priority over the other. See Davidson (1991a, 213). 
31 See also Davidson (2001b, xv) and (2000, 71). 
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3. Davidson on Prior and Passing Theories 
Davidson claimed that although it is up to an individual speaker alone to decide what her words 
mean, this practice is essentially social since without an interpreter interpreting the speaker, 
there would be no meaning to be intended at all. Davidson sometimes puts these remarks in 
terms of the theories which philosophers and theorists may employ to systematically describe 
the speakers’ abilities to speak and understand. Such theories, even in Davidson’s later works, 
are still Tarski-style theories of truth,32 though Davidson believes that if the speakers’ abilities 
to speak and to interpret are not necessarily limited to what they have learnt before, e.g., some 
fixed set of rules determining the “correct” use of words, then the theories modeling such 
abilities should not be treated as fixed in advance of the particular conversation they have with 
each other and constrained to generate just the conventional meanings of the words. In this 
regard, he distinguishes between what he calls “prior theories” and “passing theories”: 
For the hearer, the prior theory expresses how he is prepared in advance to interpret an utterance 
of the speaker, while the passing theory is how he does interpret the utterance. For the speaker, 
the prior theory is what he believes the interpreter’s prior theory to be, while the passing theory 
is the theory that he intends the interpreter to use. (1986, 101) 
Prior theories contain what the speaker or the interpreter knows before their particular 
conversation begins. They have expectations of how the future conversation between the two 
may go, of the “expected meanings” – as we may call them so – which the speaker may attach 
to her words and which the interpreter is prepared to grasp on the basis of his previous 
interpretations of the speaker. This is just to say that the speaker, based on her expectations of 
what the interpreter knows about her and the environment, knows how to speak in an 
understandable way. Such prior theories can contain the conventional meanings of words. But 
Davidson adds that they can also contain information about the use of the words, or their 
meanings, in the past. If we want to describe the situation, it is as if the speaker and the 
interpreter are equipped with a prior theory of interpretation.33 As before, Davidson argues that 
sharing such prior theories is neither necessary nor sufficient for guaranteeing success in their 
communication since what matters is what the speaker now intends to mean by her words. The 
                                                            
32 See Davidson (1986, 95-96). 
33 See Davidson (1986, 100). 
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speaker may go on differently this time. Passing theories, however, produce what the speaker 
presently intends to mean by her words on this particular occasion. For Davidson, 
communication is successful simply if passing theories coincide, that is, if the speaker speaks 
in an interpretable way and the interpreter interprets the speaker in the way the speaker intended 
her utterance to be interpreted: “What two people need, if they are to understand one another 
through speech, is the ability to converge on passing theories from utterance to utterance” 
(Davidson 1986, 106). If that is true, then “it is not a condition on successful communication 
that prior theories be shared” (Davidson 1986, 103).  
   More importantly, Davidson makes a second claim which is not usually appreciated by his 
commentators. He believes that reaching such an agreement on what the speaker intends to 
mean by her words – converging on passing theories – is not something that can be formalized 
or characterized especially in terms of some previously fixed conventions. The communicators 
possess certain linguistic skills, the abilities to know how to use words (to apply them to certain 
things in the world) in an understandable way and how to understand the utterances of others 
via using the available evidence and clues. For Davidson, the process through which they come 
to such an understanding (or convergence) cannot be explained in terms of their following some 
rules or conventions since such abilities are acquired in different ways and hence the 
communicators’ strategies to reach such a convergence would be different: they have different 
backgrounds of knowledge, information, gender, social status, family, personality, habits, and 
so on. Therefore, “there are no rules for arriving at passing theories” (Davidson 1986, 107). 
This means that there are no rules following which guarantees success in communication. There 
are no such rules because in order to converge on a passing theory – to speak in an 
understandable way and to understand the speech of another – much non-linguistic general 
information is required. As Davidson puts it, “a passing theory … is derived by wit, luck, and 
wisdom from a private vocabulary and grammar, knowledge of the ways people get their point 
across, and rules of thumb for figuring out what deviations from the dictionary are most likely” 
(1986, 107). Does this mean that we could not try to say more about this process? It seems that 
we could, but Davidson does not think that we should. Pushing towards offering more 
explanations of these processes and practices would lead to misunderstandings of them (as we 
will see in Davidson’s attack on Dummett). This is the reason why Davidson concludes that 
“there is no … chance of regularizing, or teaching, this process” (1986, 107). 
   Therefore, understanding a language, for Davidson, is to master a technic, to know how to 
use words in an understandable way. But this is a view of knowing-how irreducible to that of 
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knowing-that. Although, for Davidson, the speakers’ ability to speak and understand can still 
be described by employing a Tarski-style theory of truth, it does not mean that they have 
thereby propositional knowledge of such theories: speakers neither explicitly nor implicitly 
know such theories, and it is not because of knowing such theories that they can communicate 
with each other. As he states, “to say that an explicit theory for interpreting a speaker is a model 
of the interpreter’s linguistic competence is not to suggest that the interpreter knows any such 
theory. …They are rather claims about what must be said to give a satisfactory description of 
the competence of the interpreter” (1986, 95-96 emphasis added). Our talk of such theories 
“comes to no more than the fact that the speaker is able to speak as if he believed the interpreter 
would interpret him in the way the theory describes, and the fact that the interpreter is prepared 
so to interpret him” (Davidson 1990a, 312 emphases added). For, and this is important, “it is 
not altogether obvious that there is anything we actually know which plays an essential role in 
interpretation” (Davidson 1973a, 125). Hence, Davidson’s remarks do not aim “to say that 
either speaker or interpreter is aware of or has propositional knowledge of the contents of such 
a theory” (Davidson 1990a, 312 emphases added). The reason, again, is that in speaking and 
understanding much general information, luck, intuition, non-propositional and non-linguistic 
knowledge is involved. Speakers rather know how to speak in an interpretable way. This is all 
Davidson has to tell us. He just describes the situation, rather than explains it. 
  
3.1. Dummett vs. Davidson on the Social Character of Language 
Davidson rejected the idea that shared linguistic practices across a community of speakers, 
such as the conventional way of using words, can be taken to be essential to their success in 
communication. One may take this claim to be standing against the Wittgensteinian idea that 
agreement across a community of speakers is basic to the existence of our everyday linguistic 
practices. But, according to Davidson’s reading of Wittgenstein, what Wittgenstein is 
suggesting via his discussion of private language and rule-following is that speaking a language 
is necessarily a social activity and this claim, for Davidson, should not be treated as amounting 
to any form of conventionalism or communitarianism, according to which sharing certain rules, 
norms, conventions, or in general any shared way of speaking is essential to the existence of 
successful communication. For this, Davidson says “while I accept the idea that communication 
is the source of objectivity, I do not think communication depends on speakers using the same 
words to express the same thoughts” (1991a, 209, fn. 1). For him, the requirement of meaning 
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the same thing by the same words is a limited conception of “agreement” and Wittgenstein’s 
remarks do not lead to such an idea. What Davidson took Wittgenstein to be suggesting is a 
wider and deeper conception of an “agreement”: the agreement between the speaker and the 
interpreter regarding what the speaker intends her utterance to mean. Such a conception of 
agreement involves what we may call a Davidsonian interpretation of the Wittgensteinian idea 
of “form of life”: “much successful communing goes on that does not depend on previously 
learned common practices, for recognizing this helps us appreciate the extent to which 
understanding, even of the literal meaning of a speaker’s utterances, depends on shared general 
information and familiarity with non-linguistic institutions (a ‘way of life’)” (Davidson 1994a, 
19). I will soon come back to this important passage. 
   Davidson’s rejection of conventionalism and similar views, as indicated in Section 1.1, stems 
from his rejection of a particular mode of theorizing about our linguistic practices, i.e., the idea 
that speaking a language and playing games are analogous. One of the advocates of such a view 
is Dummett. Davidson criticizes Dummett’s reading of Wittgenstein regarding the social aspect 
of language. As he says, “I hold that the answer to the question what it is to go on as before 
demands reference to social interaction. Where I disagree [with Dummett] is on how this 
demand can be met” (1994a, 124). Davidson takes the notion of idiolect (the particular way a 
particular speaker speaks on a certain occasion) to be basic, while Dummett takes the notion 
of a language (as a set of syntactical and semantical rules) to be essential to the existence of 
our basic linguistic practices, such as that of assertion.34 As Davidson says of his difference 
with Dummett, “My mistake, in his [Dummett’s] eyes, is that I take defining a language as the 
philosophically rather unimportant task of grouping idiolects” (1994a, 111). Dummett certainly 
thinks so because, for him, “conventions … are what constitute a social practice; to repudiate 
the role of convention is to deny that a language is in this sense a practice” (Dummett 1986, 
474). For Davidson, however, we should get rid of these “shallow” notions. What is basic to 
communication is understanding: if the utterance of the speaker is successfully interpreted as 
she intended, it does not really matter whether her use of words is appraised to be correct (or 
incorrect) in accordance with certain rules or agreed-on conventions. For this reason, Davidson 
famously concludes that  
there is no such thing as a language, not if a language is anything like what many philosophers 
and linguists have supposed. …We must give up the idea of a clearly defined shared structure 
                                                            
34 See, e.g., Davidson (1979, 110). 
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which language-users acquire and then apply to cases. … we should give up the attempt to 
illuminate how we communicate by appeal to conventions. (1986, 107)  
Dummett thinks of this view of language as “absurd”, since “the need for the notion of a 
language is apparent” (Dummett 1986, 474). For him, “our use of our language [should be] 
considered as a conventional practice in which we progressively learn to engage as we learn to 
speak” (1996, 160). We saw, in Section 1.1, why Davidson took such a view to be leading us 
to a misunderstanding of such practices: it took speaking a language and playing and winning 
a game to be analogous; this analogy is “radically defective” (Davidson 1984b, 268).  
   Dummett’s and Davidson’s readings of Wittgenstein’s remarks on the social character of 
language diverge on another important point. For Dummett, Wittgenstein’s slogan that 
“meaning is use” implies that “the knowledge in which a speaker’s understanding of a sentence 
consists must be capable of being fully manifested by his linguistic practice” (1996, 116).35 A 
speaker’s grasp of the concept of square must be manifested in her ability “to discriminate 
between things that are square and those that are not” (Dummett 1996, 98); hence, the speaker 
is to apply the word to square things and not to others.36 Davidson’s attack on such a view was 
inspired by Wittgenstein’s remarks on ostensive learning, according to which what is 
fundamental here is the speaker’s ability to judge that “square” can be understandably applied 
to some things, rather than her disposition to discriminate between the things that are a certain 
way and those that are not. Forming such a judgement, for Davidson, essentially depended on 
the speaker’s possession, and application, of the concept of truth. Dummett extends his view 
to the case of sentences. In the crucial case of undecidable sentences,37 the speaker fails to fully 
manifest her knowledge of such sentences’ meanings (their truth-conditions). Thus, as he says, 
“the notion of truth … must be explained, in some manner, in terms of our capacity to recognize 
statements as true, and not in terms of a condition which transcends human capacities” (1996, 
76). Davidson’s view, however, is different: “I considered truth to be the central primitive 
concept, and hoped, by detailing truth’s structure, to get at meaning” (Davidson 2001a, xiv). 
Meaning can have a chance to emerge if the speaker grasps the seems right/is right distinction. 
                                                            
35 See also Dummett (1996, 36, 91, 108, 113, 116, 179-180) and (1991, 305-306). 
36 On this, see also Wright (1993, 247). 
37 That is, the ones “for which a speaker has some effective procedure which will, in a finite time, put him into a 
position in which he can recognize whether or not the conditions for the truth of the sentence is satisfied” 
(Dummett 1996, 45). 
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Davidson’s Wittgenstein’s view of the social character of language implies that the speaker’s 
understanding of the meaning of her words is not required to be manifested in her rule-governed 
use of the words; rather in her success in communication. The speaker is free to intend to use 
her words in whatever way she may only if such a use can be understood by her hearer in the 
way the speaker intended. This is a different sort of view, different from conventionalist and 
communitarianist conceptions of meaning.38 Davidson, hence, believes that Dummett’s reading 
of Wittgenstein misses an essential feature of our linguistic practices: “Dummett thinks that by 
promoting the primacy of the idiolect I run afoul of Wittgenstein’s ban on private languages; 
in my view Dummett, by making language primary, has misplaced the essential social element 
in linguistic behavior” (Davidson 1994a, 109). Davidson rather “looks at language from the 
start as a social transaction and therefore concentrates on what one person can learn about 
another in the context of a shared world” (1988b, 190).39  
   Davidson extends the domain of his criticism: “if the concept of following a rule is not quite 
appropriate to describe meaning something by saying something, it is also questionable 
whether … we should accept without question the idea that meaning something demands (as 
opposed to sometimes involving) a convention, custom, or institution” (1992, 114). This claim 
looks like a rejection of Wittgenstein’s view that using a language is to master a technic and 
that agreement across a community of speakers sharing their basic linguistic practices is 
fundamental to the existence of such practices. As Wittgenstein says, “To obey a rule, to make 
a report, to give an order, to play a game of chess, are customs (uses, institutions). To 
understand a sentence means to understand a language. To understand a language means to be 
master of a technique” (1953, §199). However, we saw why it would be too fast to conclude 
that Davidson is against such a view since, according to Davidson’s reading of Wittgenstein, 
such institutions are still fundamental to the existence of our linguistic practices, but 
Davidson’s Wittgenstein disagrees (with Dummett’s) that these institutions must be limited to 
those of shared rules and conventions about correct use across a speech-community. Davidson 
denies the essentiality of “linguistic institutions” for the existence of our linguistic practices, 
but his target is not Wittgenstein, rather a particular (here, Dummett’s and elsewhere Kripke’s) 
reading of Wittgenstein. What Davidson opposes is the view that these institutions can be taken 
to be essentially determining the meaning of words, or their correct use, in advance of the 
                                                            
38 For a defense of Davidson, see McDowell (1981). 
39 For more on this disagreement between Dummett and Davidson, see Ludwig and Lepore (2007). 
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particular conversation two people may have and, as a result, to count any deviation from this 
particular way of speaking as a linguistic error. Davidson reads Wittgenstein’s ideas 
differently. As he puts it, “Perhaps we [Dummett and Davidson] even agree on the underlying 
reason, namely Wittgenstein’s, that without a social environment nothing could count as 
misapplying words in speech. Where we part company is in how we think the social 
environment makes its essential contribution” (1994a, 113).  
   The important point to note here is that Davidson does not have the same negative view of 
what he calls “non-linguistic institutions” or a “way of life”. Davidson and Dummett offer two 
different readings of Wittgenstein’s idea of a form of life and of what this notion implies: 
according to one reading, a “form of life” (conceived as “linguistic institutions”) implies the 
existence of wide agreements across a community of speakers (in the form of a fixed set of 
rules or conventions) about what words mean or how they ought to be used, and according to 
the other, a “form of life” (conceived as “non-linguistic institutions”) treats sharing non-
linguistic information as essential to the existence of such practices, together with the 
familiarity with the speaker’s attitudes, environment, habits, life and so forth. It is this latter 
conception of “agreement” which Davidson takes seriously. Moreover, as indicated in Section 
3, Davidson thinks that there would be no explanation of how such an agreement is reached 
because, again, it involves such non-linguistic information. We can at best only describe what 
is probably involved in success in understanding. Consider the way Davidson describes such 
general knowledge, i.e., a way of life: “The knowledge on which we rely, however intuitively, 
is just about everything we know. This is why I wrote that there are no rules for arriving at 
passing theories” (1998b, 327).40 There is no finite list of things a speaker should know in order 
to say of her that she has possessed the ability to speak and to understand. Such knowledge, to 
repeat, is very similar to a form of knowing-how or mastering a technic: “Knowing a language 
is … like knowing how to ride a bicycle” (Davidson 1998b, 325). Davidson here is by all means 
Wittgensteinian. What about his view of Wittgenstein’s quietism? 
 
4. Davidson and the Matter of Description vs. Explanation 
Davidson’s treatment of the aforementioned problems about meaning, especially his discussion 
of triangulation and his rejection of conventionalism and communitarianism, showed how he 
                                                            
40 See also Davidson (1986, 107). 
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attempts to resist what he takes to be a bad philosophy, implausible theories about our most 
basic linguistic practices. Such theories (which, for him, many philosophers have endorsed) 
cannot explain what is basic to linguistic communication, that is, mutual understanding; and 
this latter, Davidson seemed to believe, should be left unexplained. Although he argues against 
a certain sort of understating of such practices, he himself does not really tell us what it is to 
mean something by an utterance and what it is to understand such utterances. He just invites 
us to look at the role our habits, intuition and non-linguistic information – which we have of 
each other, of the world and of the occasion of speech – plays in our success in these practices. 
I believe Davidson’s reasons for his reluctance to provide such explanations are 
Wittgensteinian. This point needs more clarification. 
 
4.1. Wittgenstein’s Quietism 
I have claimed that Davidson does not actually provide us with any explanation of meaning-
determination and success in communication and I already tried to cite evidence for the 
additional claim that Davidson is not inclined to do so mostly for Wittgensteinian reasons. This 
is an important metaphilosophical point about Davidson’s works and perhaps the source of 
many controversies about his metaphysical positions about meaning. To begin with, we can 
imagine different routes Davidson could pursue if he really wanted to follow an anti-quietist 
approach in order to deal with the aforementioned issues about meaning and communication. 
To give some examples, Stoutland (1982a, 1982b) and Antony (1994), for instance, attempt to 
argue that Davidson’s philosophy of language can be construed as anti-realistic and 
incompatible with semantic realism.41 Platts (1997, 1980) thinks that Davidson’s philosophy 
can be labeled realistic and Malpas (1992) attempts to argue “for a view of Davidson as a 
‘realist’” (1992, 14). Verheggen and Myers (2016, 88-90) argue that Davidson can be 
interpreted as a non-reductionist about meaning. What about Davidson as a quietist? This 
option is not properly investigated and the reason might be that Davidson has never been clear 
about his metaphilosophical view. What I aim to do here is to provide more evidence to support 
a quietist reading of Davidson. But let me first briefly introduce what I mean by Wittgenstein’s 
quietism. 
                                                            
41 See Miller and Hossein Khani (2015) for a criticism of Stoutland and for the claim that Davidson’s philosophy 
is compatible with realism. See also Child (2001) for a middle position. 
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   Wittgenstein has famously stated that “philosophy may in no way interfere with the actual 
use of language; it can in the end only describe it. For it cannot give it any foundation either. It 
leaves everything as it is” (1953, §124). According to Wittgenstein, our actual linguistic 
practices cannot be given any foundation. Does he have any reason for this claim? It seems he 
has: attempting to provide such a foundation leads to philosophical misunderstandings of such 
practices, which amount to unwelcome conclusions, such as that of the rule-following paradox. 
Davidson too stopped explaining such practices because he thought that such a foundation for 
these practices cannot be given and he believed so not because he thought it is impossible to 
try to offer one, but because doing so would lead to philosophical misunderstandings. For him, 
one who wishes to explain our actual linguistic practices would fail to fully appreciate their 
essential feature, that is, that they are social practices in which not only is the presence of others 
interacting with each other essential to their existence, but much non-linguistic information is 
also involved in such a way that any attempt to regulate them would inevitably fail to do justice 
to the complexities of such practices. Employing the notion of rules and conventions (in 
general, linguistic institutions) would be as unhelpful as the claim that speakers have 
propositional knowledge of theories of meaning leading them to understand each other. 
   Wittgenstein claimed that “the philosopher’s treatment of a question is like the treatment of 
an illness” (1953, §255). But what does this claim imply? Is Wittgenstein against just any sort 
of attempt to talk about these questions and problems? He definitely is not and it is no plausible 
to think so: in order to treat an illness, you need to know about it, to properly investigate it and 
to successfully describe it. As McDowell (2009) puts it, Wittgenstein “is talking about a 
particular mode of philosophical activity. We do best not to take him to be making 
pronouncements about just anything that counts as philosophy” (2009, 367). Wittgenstein’s 
“aim here is to give philosophy peace, in the face of a temptation to find a mystery, which 
would need to be alleviated by substantive philosophy. The label is all right if all it conveys is 
the aim of quieting the felt need for substantive philosophy” (McDowell 2009, 370). What is 
such a temptation in the case of meaning? McGinn (1997) traces the root of it back to the 
temptation to apply scientific methods to what we ought not. Wittgenstein has famously said 
that “philosophers constantly see the method of science before their eyes, and are irresistibly 
tempted to ask and to answer questions in the way science does. This tendency is the real source 
of metaphysics and leads philosophers into complete darkness” (1958, 18). Wittgenstein surely 
does not discard science or the merits of scientific methods in general; rather, as McGinn puts 
it, he believes that “the methods of science, in particular the ideas of explanation and discovery, 
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are misleading and inappropriate when applied to questions like ‘What is meaning?’, ‘What is 
thought?’” (1997, 20).42 I think, in many respects, Davidson agrees with such a quietist view. 
We discussed his similar way of treating a variety of problems about meaning, e.g., about 
knowledge of meaning-theories, convergence on passing theories and the shift from primitive 
to linguistic triangulation (on which I will say more). In all such crucial cases, Davidson 
thought that doing more to explain them is a temptation that should be avoided if we want to 
avoid misunderstanding them. Davidson, in addition, famously stated that applying the 
methods of science to the questions like ‘What is meaning?’ and ‘What is thought?’ is 
misleading and leads to misunderstanding of the mental realm and the essential difference 
between the way the mental and the physical can be described, a claim which supplies 
additional evidence for his consent to Wittgenstein’s quietism. 
   Davidson draws a significant distinction between the application of the laws of science and 
the rules of rationality. Although he employs the notion of causality in his explanation of 
intentional action, that is, although he believes that “at least some mental events interact 
causally with physical events” (1970, 208), he denies that there can be any “strict deterministic 
laws on the basis of which mental events can be predicted and explained” (1970, 208). 
Davidson thinks that his employment of the concept of causality may be taken to be standing 
against the Wittgensteinian idea that “the methods of the poet, the critic, and the social scientist 
not only are different from, but also opposed to, the methods of the sciences of (the rest of) 
nature” (Davidson 1993a, 168). He agrees that using the notion of causality may seem like here 
we are tempted to apply the methods of science, but he rejects that there can be nomological 
connections between the mental and the physical (that is, psychophysical laws governing this 
relation) because the realm of the mental is governed by a different sort of rules, the rules of 
rationality.43 For Davidson, this distinction would help to reconcile the two views (his and 
Wittgenstein’s) which were mistakenly thought to be radically different. The mistake stems 
from a misunderstanding of the role which the notion of causality is supposed to play in his 
view, a mistake which vanishes once we notice that Davidson aims to use “the ‘unscientific’ 
concept of cause” (Davidson 1990b, 98). This, however, does not mean that the gap between 
                                                            
42 Here I am not concerned with the philosophers who are against Wittgenstein’s quietism, such as Wright (2001) 
and, to some extent, Brandom (1994). On Wittgenstein’s quietism, see also Malcom (1984), Rorty (1982, 22) and 
(2007), Horwich (2013), Kenny (2006), Mulhall (2007), Fogelin (2009), Price (2015) and Macarthur (2017) and 
(2008). 
43 Such as the principle of charity which “maximizes intelligibility” (Davidson 1991a, 215) in the speaker’s 
behaviour by attributing true (or even sometimes false) beliefs to her. 
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the mental and the physical now disappears; it is rather a gap “that must exist between two 
schemes of description and explanation, one, the mental, being essentially normative, the other 
not” (1990b, 98). This normative character of mental concepts is “a primitive aspect of 
rationality” (Davidson 1987b, 115). Following McGinn’s interpretation of Wittgenstein’s 
quietism, Davidson too agrees that “there can be no serious science or sciences of the mental” 
(Davidson 1995, 122-123). Searching for such a science is a temptation to avoid. Otherwise, it 
would lead to a misunderstanding of the essential feature of the mental and the semantical. 
Davidson confesses that his reasons here are Wittgensteinian too since it was Wittgenstein who 
said “the confusion and barrenness of psychology is not to be explained by calling it a ‘young 
science’; its state is not comparable with that of physics … The existence of the experimental 
method makes us think we have the means of solving the problems which trouble us; though 
problem and method pass one another by” (Wittgenstein 1953, II, xiv). Having quoted this 
passage from Wittgenstein, Davidson continues: “I take this to apply not just to psychology as 
it existed when Wittgenstein wrote, but to be a judgment sub specie aeternitatis” (1995, 117).  
    
5. Wittgenstein’s Quietism and Davidson’s Triangulation 
Was Davidson really after offering an “explanation” of meaning-determination in his 
discussion of triangulation? As I have generally pointed out, I think he was not. Triangulation 
at best added a causal story to what we may call the meaning-determination process. At the end 
of the day, Davidson did not provide us with anything newer than what he already, inspired by 
Wittgenstein, offered: engaging in mutual interpretation, induction and evidence-collecting, 
this time more vividly combined with features of his externalism. I argued that although 
Davidson is admittedly an externalist and Wittgenstein may or may not be so, the problems 
they were concerned with were essentially of the same kind. Moreover, I also showed that 
using the notion of triangulation by Davidson is all about meeting Wittgenstein’s essential 
requirement of drawing the seems right/is right distinction, without appealing to shared 
practices of a speech-community. But does Davidson explain how the concepts of right and 
wrong are acquired, how creatures come up with meaningful responses, or how the aspect 
problem is solved via engaging in linguistic triangulation? He does not; he rather leaves us with 
an analogy alone. Consider his description of what he calls the “argument” from triangulation:  
To complete the ‘argument’, however, I need to show that the only way one could come to have 
the belief–truth [the seems right/is right] contrast is through having the concept of 
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intersubjective truth. I confess I do not know how to show this… In place of an argument …, I 
offer … [an] analogy. (1982, 105) 
The analogy that Davidson then offers is a description of a triangular situation. Consider also 
this passage: “What must be added to a meaningless sound, uttered at moments appropriate for 
that same sound, uttered as speech, to transmute the former into the latter? … I am under no 
illusion that I can provide anything like an analysis; perhaps there is no answer that does not 
lead in a circle” (Davidson 1997c, 139). Davidson admits that any such attempt would probably 
lead to a philosophical misunderstanding, a circular account of what makes it the case that one 
sound can be viewed as meaningful and another cannot. He does not think that any proper 
analysis, any foundation, can be offered of it; rather just some analogy, some description of the 
situations in which some creatures may come up with a language, i.e., the situation of 
triangulation between the creatures which are inclined to respond to the world in similar ways, 
very similar to the situations Wittgenstein described in his discussion of ostensive learning. 
Both Wittgenstein and Davidson saw involving in such situations alone as insufficient to 
explain what makes a sound meaningful and both seemed to end up with the idea that it is better 
we leave the matter as it is and instead look at our linguistic practices and see how essential the 
role of complex “non-linguistic institutions” is in these practices. Davidson followed 
Wittgenstein to argue that language and thought are essentially social: “Wittgenstein expresses 
this idea when he talks of the difference between following a rule and merely thinking one is 
following a rule; … [his] point isn’t that consensus defines the concept of truth but that it 
creates the space for its application. If this is right, then thought as well as language is 
necessarily social” (1999a, 129). If language is so, there needs to be some sort of agreement 
between the speaker and the interpreter, but, as Davidson reads the Wittgensteinian notion of 
“agreement”, we only need agreement on understanding, rather than agreement on rule-
governed uses of words: “Wittgenstein put us on the track of the only possible answer .... The 
source of the concept of objective truth is interpersonal communication. Thought depends on 
communication” (1991a, 209).44 And, for Davidson, this “follows at once if we suppose that 
language is essential to thought and we agree with Wittgenstein that there cannot be a private 
language” (1991a, 209). Davidson, in his own Wittgensteinian way, invites us to look at our 
everyday linguistic practices and their extreme complexities and warns us of the 
misunderstandings which his Wittgenstein detected before: further attempts to explain these 
                                                            
44 For a different view on this matter, see Wikforss (2017, 63). 
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practices, as Davidson previously argued for, lead either to circular accounts or to implausible 
(Dummettian) ones. Davidson too “is meant to bring into prominence the fact that the speaking 
of language is part of an activity” (Wittgenstein 1953, §23). 
   With regard to Wittgenstein’s quietism and Davidson’s triangulation we can still say more.  
In Davidson’s triangulation, it was nothing but the similarity of responses of the triangulators 
that could give rise to the existence of a sort of correctness conditions. Sharing such responses 
was essential, according to Davidson, if there is to be any opportunity for them to grasp the 
seems right/is right distinction: when the correlation between their (previously) similar 
responses is broken, one can now observe that the other is responding differently. But what is 
the source of such similarities? For Davidson, “all creatures … treat some stimuli as more alike 
than others. The criterion of such classifying activity is similarity of response. Evolution and 
subsequent learning no doubt explain these patterns of behavior” (1991a, 212). Davidson’s 
appeal to evolution and such empirical facts is just his way of confirming that we do not really 
know why the creatures like us respond similarly. As he says, “evolution has made us more or 
less fit for our environment, but evolution could not endow us with concepts” (1997c, 134). 
Here too Davidson, like Wittgenstein, concedes that it is nothing but an empirical fact about us 
that we generally agree in our responses to the world. As Wittgenstein puts it, “What has to be 
accepted, the given, is … forms of life” (1953, 226).     
   I also suggested that triangulation is better understood as an analogy, a metaphor, that at best 
shows how Davidson’s externalism can accommodate the Wittgensteinian seems right/is right 
distinction: no creature can have determinate causes for her responses and hence meaningful 
responses without mastering this distinction. It is true that Davidson brings in the notion of 
linguistic triangulation after showing that primitive triangulation cannot be enough for 
language and thoughts to emerge, but he did not really offer any explanation of such a 
significant jump from primitive (non-linguistic) triangulation to linguistic triangulation: 
[I]t is only in interpersonal communication that there can be thought … The reason for this is, 
in my opinion, that there is no other way to answer Wittgenstein’s question, in what consists 
the difference between thinking one is following a rule, and actually following it. … Our 
thoughts and words carry us out into the world ... This connection with the world can be 
established only by shared reactions to a shared environment [i.e. Triangulation]. (Davidson 
1997b, 274-275) 
He just tells us that once our responses are linguistic, the depth and the width problems are 
solved and hence we have meaningful responses. We saw that neither did he offer any argument 
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establishing the claim that in order to have meaningful responses we necessarily need linguistic 
communication (he just offered an analogy), nor did he explain why the above problems are 
solved if our responses become linguistic. How is linguistic triangulation supposed to solve the 
aspect or width problem? Even without knowing the details about linguistic triangulation, it is 
clear that the creatures’ responses merely turning into linguistic would not by itself help to 
solve this problem. A parrot’s responding by “table” in the presence of the same table in view 
does not help to claim that it now possesses a language and thoughts. The creatures’ responses 
becoming linguistic would matter, however, only if we presume in advance that linguistic 
responses are already meaningful, or as Davidson said, that the triangulators are capable of 
making judgements about the correctness (understandability) of their responses. Making such 
an assumption presupposes, rather than explains, that the aspect problem is solved. This is the 
reason why Davidson thinks that saying more on this would lead to either circular explanations 
or miscontruals of these matters. We better not to attempt to explain them. And this is one 
reason why I think Davidson’s use of the notion of triangulation is nothing more than an 
analogy to describe such practices. But, what about Davidson’s project of constructing formal 
theories of meaning? 
 
6. Davidson’s Theory of Meaning and Wittgenstein’s Quietism 
According to Davidson, Rorty’s worry is that there is a tension between Davidson’s semantical 
project and Davidson’s use of Wittgensteinian remarks. As he puts Rorty’s criticism, 
Rorty sees some of my views as serving his Wittgensteinian agenda … He is less pleased by 
my persistent interest in Tarskian semantics. Like many others, he views these tendencies as 
opposed, and urges me to forgo the second. But I can’t, because what Rorty holds to be 
antithetical modes of philosophizing I see as interdependent aspects of the same enterprise. 
Insofar as I have arrived at …Wittgensteinian thoughts, it is largely through having taken a 
third person approach to the problems of intentionality, and this is an approach which has 
always seemed to me to require (along with much more) the framework provided by the 
structures of formal semantics and decision theory. (Davidson 1998b, 315) 
Davidson here reads Wittgenstein’s view in his own way. Not only does he rightly point out 
that his methodology of taking the third-person stand point is essentially Wittgensteinian, but 
he also tells us that his early semantical project is not in conflict with Wittgenstein’s agenda, 
among which quietism is prominent. His reason is that without talking about formal theories 
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of meaning, which, for him, systematically describe the speakers’ linguistic skills, we cannot 
even start saying anything interesting about such skills and powers. As Davidson says, “only a 
full recursive theory can do justice to these powers” (1986, 103). I think Davidson is right in 
his claim that the matter of describing the speakers’ abilities is not necessarily in conflict with 
Wittgenstein’s quietism. As McDowell (2009) pointed out, Wittgenstein’s quietism is not 
against just any attempt to talk about our linguistic practices. Luntley (2003) nicely puts the 
point when he introduces Wittgenstein’s quietism about meaning as the view that “all that can 
be done is to describe the practices by which we mean things with words and how we respond 
and how we take ourselves in all this to be bound by norms” (2003, 99). Davidson is completely 
on board with Wittgenstein’s quietism on this matter. Although Davidson does his best to 
describe linguistic practices and abilities, he does not involve in explaining how such abilities 
emerge, how we use them to reach an understanding of each other, or any claim about speakers’ 
having any sort of propositional knowledge of such theories. Davidson himself warned us that 
we should not confuse the hope to describe such abilities with the hope to formalize or 
characterize what is really involved in arriving at understanding. He sees these remarks to be 
in harmony with each other and with Wittgenstein’s agenda:  
Rorty suggests that you can grasp my arguments for saying that interpreting a speaker involves 
knowing one’s way around in the world even if you have no interest in a systematic theory of 
language. But I did not say that knowing one’s way around in the world didn’t include skills 
that can only be described by appeal to a formal theory. (Davidson 1998b, 316 emphasis added) 
At the points we expect philosophical explanations from Davidson, he leaves us with 
philosophical descriptions and analogies. As McDowell, Kenny, Luntley, McGinn and many 
others warned us, Wittgenstein’s quietism does not imply giving up on saying anything 
interesting about linguistic practices (indeed, the Investigations is full of such interesting 
remarks). This view does not prevent us from thinking about them and describing them. Rather 
Wittgenstein’s quietism reminds us of when we should give up on explaining and stop applying 
methods which are not suitable for dealing with a certain sort of problems. I believe Davidson 
is completely aware of these issues.45 
 
                                                            
45 Verheggen thinks that Wittgenstein’s quietism is “a label Davidson would certainly not embrace” (2017, 97). 
In this paper, I tried to argue against such a claim: not only does he embrace Wittgensteinian quietism, but, contra 
what McDowell claims, such a quietism in Davidson’s works does not enter “too late” (1994, 17); rather it has 
been present even in his earlier philosophical works, or at least, the later Davidson thinks so. 
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7. Conclusion 
In this paper, I argued that Davidson’s later view of meaning emerges as an attempt to remove 
certain sorts of philosophical misunderstanding of our most basic linguistic practices. For 
Davidson, such practices are successful simply if the interpreter and the speaker reach an 
agreement on what the speaker means by her words, though no philosophical explanation of 
the way such success can be achieved is forthcoming. Although Davidson’s main concern is to 
accommodate the main Wittgensteinian ideas about meaning and linguistic understanding, he 
does not believe that his discussion of formal theories of meaning or his use of triangulation is 
in conflict with Wittgenstein’s quietism.  
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